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Abstract 
In  this paper we analyse the effects of soft budget constraints in an 
international context.  Firstly,  we  show that soft budget constraints 
in an exporting country lead to higher levels  of trade protection in 
the recipient country.  Secondly, the model predicts that protectionist 
trade policy helps to harden budget softness in the exporting coun-
try.  We therefore argue that, when industrial policy fails  to enforce 
financial discipline,  trade policy can take over this role.  Finally, we 
discuss potential implications of our model for EU-policy with respect 
to Central and Eastern European Countries. 
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1 1  Introduction 
Soft budget constraints (SBCs) refer to the fact that loss-making firms are 
being bailed out, either because of paternalistic reasons (Kornai, 1980), be-
.cause of politicians' influence on enterprise behaviour (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1994)  or because SBCs give rise to a commitment problem in the presence 
of irreversible investment (Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995).  SBCs were char-
acteristic of economic life under socialism1  and implied giving direct subsi-
dies to enterprises.  Consequently,  with the transition towards market-type 
economies, the hardening of budget constraints is one of the major challenges 
transition countries are facing at present.  Despite the drastic cut in direct 
subsidies, there is evidence to suggest that SBCs continue to exist, be it un-
der a different form.  Schaffer  (1998)  argues that tax arrears in the private 
sector importantly substitute for these direct subsidies2.  Alternatively, SBCs 
exist under the form of the non-collection of bills by state utility suppliers 
(e.g.  gas,  electricity,  water - EBRD, 1999,  p.  137;  Pinto et al.,  2000)  or 
under the form of soft credit to state enterprises (Perotti and Carare, 1996, 
Majumdar, 1998). 
Attention in the literature has typically concentrated on how to promote 
the hardening of budget constraints through institutional reform  (Roland, 
2000) and on the effects of SBCs on firm performance.  For example, Kornai 
(1980) finds a relation between SBCs and excessive demand for inputs.  Qian 
and Xu (1998)  analyse the link between SBCs and the lack of innovation 
in  socialist  countries.  Huang and Xu  (1999)  demonstrate how  SBCs can 
negatively influence R&D and economic growth.  Konings and Vandenbussche 
(2000)  show that SBCs lead to inferior firm  performance3.  However,  the 
effects of SBCs in an international context have been overlooked so far.  In this 
paper, we contribute to the literature by looking at how SBCs in exporting 
countries affect and are affected by trade protection in the recipient country. 
Since the opening of Central and Eastern Europe, the exports of these 
lSBCs are also present in market economies.  However, incentive distortions in a market 
economy are usually less serious.  Everaert (2000) discusses general applications of SBCs 
in market economies. 
2Schaffer (1998) argues that governments in transition countries typically fail to collect 
overdue taxes.  Consequently, these tax arrears are one of the major channels through 
which the governement continues to subsidise the economy, be it that this is much less 
visible than in the case of direct state subsidies. 
3 A more comprehensive overview of existing theOretical and empirical work on SBCs 
is found in Everaert (2000). 
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Figure 1:  Frequency AD jCVD-cases, 1992-99, (European Commission, 1996, 
2000). 
countries to the EU have increased dramatically.  At the same time, a sub-
stantial number of  protectionist actions  have  been taken by the recipient 
countries.  In particular,  anti-dumping measures and countervailing duties 
against Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) have frequently 
been used.  Figure 1 shows the high relative number of EU anti-dumping and 
countervailing duty cases against countries where SBCs can reasonably be 
expected4. 
Since SBCs can  lead to prices  below  cost,  this practice could - in  an 
international context - classify under 'dumping'5.  In turn, this could be an 
explanation of the anti-dumping measures, taken by many countries against 
CEEC-imports, the EU in particular. Alternatively, SBCs can be considered 
as subsidies against which WTO-regulation allows for countervailing duties 
to be put in place6. 
4 Amongst the SEC-countries of the Far East, we only included China, Vietnam and 
India.  For these countries,  direct empirical evidence of SECs exists.  One could 'argue 
that countries like  e.g.  Korea, Indonesia or Thailand equally suffer  from SECs.  They 
are however included in the category 'other Far East'.  In this way, our graph presents 
lower-bound evidence of a high proportion of AD/CVD-cases against SEC-countries. The 
category 'other' consists of Australia, South Africa and Norway. 
5 Notice that dumping can also prevail without below-cost pricing and that the legal def-
inition of dumping can considerably differ from its economic interpretation.  A discussion 
of the concept and its practical implementation is  given in Vandenbussche (1995). 
6 However,  the difficulty  in explicitly demonstrating the existence of a  subsidy often 
3 In this paper, we analyse the interaction between SBCs and countervailing 
tariffs by setting up a  three-stage model with two countries.  The foreign 
government moves first by deciding on the degree of budget softness, modeiled 
in the form of a subsidy.  In the second stage, the home government responds 
.by setting a  countervailing tariff to protect its domestic firms against these 
SBC-imports.  Finally, the home and the foreign firm compete for profits in 
the home market. 
The aim of this paper is  twofold.  We first  show that SBCs in  the ex-
porting country lead to higher levels of trade protection in the partner coun-
try.  Secondly, we address the question of whether these countervailing tariffs 
eliminate the incentives to subsidise production in the foreign country.  We 
demonstrate that protection by the recipient country leads to the hardening 
of budget constraints in the exporting country.  Hence, we show that, when 
industrial policy fails to impose financial discipline, trade policy can take over 
this role.  In particular, we show that, while the subsidy level is strictly pos-
itive in the absence of countervailing protection, the optimal export subsidy 
in the presence of a retaliative import tariff is negative. 
The analysis in this paper is by definition an analysis of the second best. 
SBCs persist due to the malfunctioning of domestic competition policies and 
the malfunctioning of bankruptcy laws in transition countries.  A  solution 
closer to the first best would be the enforcement of a common competition 
policy with e.g.  the EU in these countries.  However, at present competition 
policy  still very  much  remains  a  national issue.  This implies  that other 
countries,  notably trade partners, are left  with second-best tools - such as 
import tariffs - to offset the negative spillovers of SBCs in an international 
context. This is what we discuss in this paper. 
The paper is organised as follows.  In section 2 we develop a simple theo-
retical model which demonstrates that SBCs lead to higher protection in the 
recipient country and that protection is a device to harden budget softness 
in the exporting country.  A discussion of the results is presented in section 
3.  A final section comments and concludes. 
leads countries to rely  on anti-dumping legislation instead.  In the latter case,  it often 
suffices to demonstrate injury. 
4 2  Theoretical model 
To analyse the effects of SBes in the presence of a countervailing tariff, we 
develop a  simple three-stage model with two countries.  The presence of a 
countervailing tariff already suggests the timing in the model:  SBCs, being a 
subsidy in disguise, are set before protectionist action is taken.  More specif-
ically,  consider an international Cournot duopoly where two firms,  a  home 
firm and a  foreign firm,  are each located in their own country.  Both firms 
provide the home market with an identical product, i.e.  the home firm  is 
producing only for the local market while the foreign firm is exporting to the 
home market. We assume the foreign firm is  located in a transition country 
and benefits from  a  SBC.  Thus, in  the first  stage of the game the foreign 
government decides on the subsidy level  so  as to maximise foreign  welfare. 
The home country in the second stage responds by levying a countervailing 
tariff on the imports from  the foreign  producer.  In the final  stage of the 
game, both producers compete in quantities.  In particular, to see whether 
protection hardens budget constraints, we compare the optimal level of the 
foreign subsidy under the protectionist regime with the optimal level of sub-
sidisation under 'free-trade', i.e.  when the home government unilaterally opts 
for a zero tariff rate. Our results support the hypothesis of hardening budget 
constraints under protectionism. 
Demand in the home market is  given by the following  inverse  demand 
function: 
- - I 
P = P(x,x  ),  (1) 
where x and xl refer to home and foreign output respectively and where P 
refers to the price of the homogeneous product in the home market.  Demand 
is symmetric with respect to home and foreign output and downward sloping 
in both quantities.  The signs on top in expression (1)  indicate the direction 




(P - c)x 
(P - c + s - t)xf, 
(2) 
(3) 
where s stands for  the SBC and t represents the level of protection im-
posed by the home government on imports xl. Subsidies decrease and tariffs 
5 increase the marginal cost of production c7.  We assume that the marginal 
cost of production is equal for  both firms8,  i.e.  c =  cf . 
When imposing a  countervailing tariff,  we assume that the home gov-
ernment is  mainly concerned with duty revenue and with protecting home 
.producers'interests. Hence the home government's welfare objective function 
is given by the sum of these two components9: 
G(x, xf, t) =  II(x, xf) +  txf.  (4) 
Analogously, the foreign government's welfare depends on the interest of 
foreign producerslO  minus outlays for SBCs: 
Cf(Xf,x,t,S) = IIf(x,xf,t,s) - sxf.  (5) 
Throughout the paper, we assume no asymmetric information, such that 
we  can solve  the model via backward  induction.  Hence,  the equilibrium 
concept we use is  subgame perfection.  The next section solves the model 
under 'free trade', i.e.  when there is no countervailing protection.  Section 
2.2 derives the results when an optimally chosen tariff is in place. 
7Subsidies could also be aimed at reducing fixed costs.  However, in this case s will no 
longer affect equilibrinm quantities and will drop from expression (5). Hence, in this case 
there are no international spillovers of subsidisation. 
BIt could be argued that c> cf  would be the more intuitive assumption, given the fact 
that transition economies typically have a comparative labour cost advantage.  However, 
productivity differences or additional transportation costs could offset this cost advantage. 
Moreover, our results go through under c> cf . For a discussion, see section 3. 
gIn the anti-dumping literature it is  commonly  argned that consumer interests are 
ignored by the government when the latter sets a protectionist tariff (e.g.  Krueger, 1996). 
Moreover a similar objective function could be obtained from political economy models of 
trade policy where consumers are not very well organised.  Therefore, we leave consumer 
surplus out of the analysis.  An additional advantage of this assumption is that it simplifies 
our analysis.  A further discussion of this assumption is given in section 3.  We could further 
include relative weights in expression (4),  where the social cost of public funds  exceeds 
unity as in Neary (1994).  However, given the partial equilibrium nature of the model and 
to simplify the analysis, we opt for equal weights. 
lOThe government in transition countries could argnably have a different objective func-
tion, related to a preference for  more employment.  This would suggest maximisation of 
sales instead of profits.  However, in the long run survival of a firm tends to coincide with 
profit  maximisation.  In this respect, our objective function represents a  lower  bound. 
Using sales instead of profit maximisation would only strenghten our results. 
6 2.1  'Free trade' 
In this section, we solve the model when countervailing protection is absent. 
This corresponds to the case of 'free trade'll. The results derived in this part 
thus serve as a benchmark against which the results under protectionism will 
·be compared. 
Solving the game by backward induction implies that we start by solving 
the problem of setting quantities. The first order conditions (FOCs) for profit 
maximization of (2)  and (3) are 




Equations (6)  and (7)  define the reaction functions RP and Rpf that are 
illustrated in Figure 2 for the case of linear demand.  The equilibrium quan-
tities12  for  the home  and foreign  producer in  the home market  are given 
by: 
x'  (8) 
(9) 
In Figure 2 this corresponds to the intersection point A.  We  assume that 
the second order conditions (SOCs)  for  a  profit maximum are satisfied, i.e. 
demand functions are not too convex: 
2P' +xP" < 0 
2P' +xfp" < o. 
(10) 
(11) 
The properties imposed on the demand functions  further imply that the 
reaction functions are downward sloping, i.e. 
P'+xP" <0 
p' +xfp" < o. 
(12) 
(13) 
II  Notice that setting the tariff t  =  0 reduces the three-stage model in fact to a  two-
stage model.  Notice also that by setting t  =  0  expressions (3),  (4)  and (5)  are changed 
accordingly.  . 
12Equilibrium values are denoted with a star'. 
7 x 
Figure 2:  Cournot reaction curves 
In the expressions for the equilibrium quantities (8) and (9) we have indicated 
that SBCs have a positive effect on foreign output in equilibrium x! *, whereas 
they lower equilibrium output of the home producer x*.  Moreover, the effect 
of 8  is  stronger on  the foreign  output level  than on the home producer's 
output. A rigorous proof is presented in the Appendix, but these properties 
can equally be understood by looking at Figure 2.  Graphically, RFf is shifted 
up by  a  subsidy - for  a  same level  of home output,  the foreign  producer 
produces  more - such  that it leads to a  fall  of the home output  and an 
increase of foreign output in equilibrium. It is  also clear from Figure 2 that 
the effect on foreign output is larger, given that the home reaction function 
is  steeper than the foreign reaction function. 
Having solved for the optimal levels of output, we now allow the foreign 
government to choose the degree of budget softness as countervailing protec-
tion is absent, i.e.  t = o.  Finding the optimal level of the SBC requires that 
we maximise foreign welfare Cf  with respect to 8, 
cf (xf (8), X(8), 8)  = II!  (X(8),xf (8),8) - 8xf (8). 
Taking the FOC and using the envelope theorem, as shown in the Appendix, 
8 implies13 
,  dIlf dx  dxf 
G! =---s-=O. 
•  dx  ds  ds 
(14) 
From this equation, we solve for the optimal level of SBC, as set in the first 
stage of the game.  In the appendix we show that 
G~ 1.=0> 0 ===>  s· > 0,  (15) 
i.e.  the optimal subsidy s' is  positive14.  This suggests that,  under 'free 
trade', SBCs generate positive welfare effects for transition economies. 
Proposition 1  Without  counteroailing protection,  the  optimal level  of the 
SEC is strictly positive. 
Intuitively, the outcome of a positive subsidy relates to the profit-shifting 
argument, as in Brander and Spencer (1985)15. 
2.2  Countervailing tariff 
In this section, we allow the home government to respond to the foreign sub-
sidy by setting a countervailing tariff that maximises the home government's 
welfare. 
The first order conditions (FOCs) for profit maximization of (2)  and (3) 
are now 
(p - c) +  XPI = 0 
(P - c + s - t) + xf  pI = 0, 
(16) 
(17) 
and determine the associated reaction functions RP respectively Rpf. The 
SOCs as in (10) and (11) continue to apply, and so do the conditions (12) and 
1380Cs are dealt with in the appendix. 
14The properties of the demand functions  ensure that the foreign  welfare function is 
single peaked. 
15 Notice that  d~: > 0 as shown in the appendix.  Graphically, the shift in the reaction 
function  through the subsidy enables the foreign  producer to reach  a  higher  isoprofit 
function.  This means that subsidy seeking is rational from the point of view of the foreign 
producer.  From a  global welfare point of view, subsidising practices are also efficient, in 
this model where countervailing duties are absent. 
9 (13)  which ensure the reaction functions are negatively sloped.  Equilibrium 
quantities for the home and foreign producer in the home market are now a 
function of sand t: 
x* 
Xl * 
+ - x( t, s) 
1(- +)  X  t, s  . 
(18) 
(19) 
The home tariff has a positive effect on the home output in equilibrium x*, 
but a negative effect on foreign output in equilibrium xl *.  Graphically, this 
can be understood since the home tariff shifts the foreign reaction function 
down,  as  illustrated in figure  2.  Again,  the effect  of t  is stronger on the 
foreign output than on the home producer's output. The steeper slope of the 
home reaction function continues to be responsible for this.  For a rigorous 
proof, we refer the reader to the Appendix. 
After having solved for  the optimal quantities, we  now allow the home 
government to determine the optimal tariff rate. This corresponds to solving 
stage two of the game.  Maximising the home welfare function  (4)  implies 
taking the FOC with respect to t.  Using the envelope theorem, we get16 
dII dxl  dxl 
Gt = --+xl +t-=0. 
dxl  dt  dt 
(20) 
Solving for t* gives the optimal tariff.  In the Appendix, we show that t* is 
strictly positive, i.e. 
t* > 0,  \/s.  (21) 
Irrespective of the level or sign of the SBC, the optimal countervailing tariff 
is strictly positive.  Proposition 2 summarizes. 
Proposition 2  When the exporting country has a SBC-policy, a strictly~pos­
itive  countervailing tariff will always  increase  the  welfare  of the  importing 
country. 
Through the implicit function rule we further show (see Appendix) that 
t* is  increasing in the level of the SBC, 
16S0CS are dealt with in the appendix. 
10 dt(s)  -Ct. 
-d- =  -;:;- > o. 
s  U-tt 
(22) 
This implies that SBCs  in the exporting country lead to higher levels  of 
.international trade protection  by  the partner country.  Proposition three 
summarizes this result. 
Proposition 3  Soft budget constraints lead to  higher levels of international 
trade protection. 
We can further prove (see Appendix) that an increase in s leads to a less 
than proportional increase in t*, implying 
O  dt(s) 
<d;-<l.  (23) 
In other words,  SBCs will  not be fully  offset  by the countervailing import 
tariff.  Proposition four summarizes. 
Proposition 4  Countervailing tariffs are not fully countervailing. 
The final step in solving the model requires that we find the optimal level 
for the SBC, given the presence of an optimal countervailing tariff.  To do 
so, the foreign government sets the SBC-level that optimizes foreign welfare, 
given in (5).  Taking the FOC and using the envelope theorem implies17 
dxf  dP  dP  dt 
C! =  (P - c - t)ds + xf(Ts + (di -1)  ds) = O.  (24) 
From this equation, we  solve for the optimal level of the SBC. We show in 
the Appendix that 
(25) 
i.e.  the optimal subsidy s' is negative18.  This suggests that the optimal policy 
for  the exporting country when a  countervailing tariff is  in place,  requires 
levying a  tax on exports,  instead of giving a  subsidy.  Thus, the negative 
optimal subsidy is in fact an optimal tax. Proposition five summarises. 
17800s are dealt with in the appendix. 
18 The properties of the demand functions ensure·  that the foreign  welfare function is 
single peaked. 
11 Proposition 5  Under countervailing protection, the optimal level of subsidi-
sation is strictly negative. 
Our results thus suggest  that, with optimal countervailing protection, 
the incentive for allowing SBCs ceases to exist.  Recall that the outcome for 
's'  was strictly positive when the countervailing tariff was  absent.  Hence, 
comparing the optimal subsidy levels leads to the following ranking: 
(26) 
This suggests that countervailing protection hardens budget constraints 
in the exporting country.  For transition countries, this implies that, when 
industrial policy fails  to impose financial  discipline,  trade policy can take 
over this role.  This is what proposition six states. 
Proposition 6  Protection hardens budget constraints. 
3  Discussion of the results 
So far, we have solved for the optimal values of the decision variables in each 
of the three stages of the model and have given some intuitive explanation 
for  the outcomes.  Two main conclusions arose from the theoretical analy-
sis.  Firstly, SBCs lead to higher levels of trade protection.  Secondly, trade 
protection leads to lower  levels of SBCs;  in other words,  trade protection 
hardens budget constraints. 
So far,  we have also refrained from concretizing the 'home' and 'foreign' 
transition country. However, an immediate application ofthe analysis relates 
to the relation between the EU and the CEECs. 
Our model predicts that EU anti-dumping or countervailing duties against 
CEEC-imports can impose the necessary financial  discipline to which the 
governments in these transition countries cannot credibly commit themselves. 
EU-policy may thus be a way of helping these countries in establishing hard 
budget discipline19.  Given the political difficulties transition countries face 
19 An additional benefit from having a  protectionist EU trade policy (t' > 0)  in place, 
consists of the fact that transition countries are now forced to tax exports - instead of to 
subsidise them. This gives them an extra source of liquidity. 
Notice that the hardening of budget constraints is  (only) an externality effect, implied 
by the model:  it arises when all agents act in their 'own interest, maximising their own 
welfare. 
12 in enforcing hard budget constraints (Schleifer and Vishny,  1994), external 
constraints - in this case EU countervailing protection - may be particularly 
effective. In an empirical study for Italy, Bertero and Rondi (2000) show how 
the requirements for participating in the European Single Market programme 
ap.d for entering'the European Monetary Union at the time created powerful 
incentives for disciplining Italian state-owned enterprises in respecting hard 
budget constraints. Similar external constraints for transition countries, like 
an EU protectionist trade policy,  might be equally effective in constraining 
firms' behaviour to limit budget softness2o. 
Our results should not be abused by those favouring protectionism. Rather, 
it is  due to the deficiency of national competition and bankruptcy policies 
that second-best responses, like trade policy, ought to secure the hardening of 
budget constraints. An alternative way to impose harder budget constraints 
in CEECs would be to enforce a common competition policy with e.g.  the 
EU21 .  However, as long as the CEECs are not fully integrated into the EU, 
EU competition law  does not fully  apply22.  In the absence of a  common 
competition policy, trade policy measures, like anti-dumping or countervail-
ing duties, can be used by the EU to counter any practices, stemming from 
the malfunctioning of bankruptcy and competition laws in transition coun-
tries. 
Next, we discuss the robustness of our results. 
The home welfare function in our model, does not include consumer sur-
plus.  Including it would not change our results qualitatively, but would make 
the analysis much more tedious23 . 
20 A related issue is that the EU might also be directly preoccupied with fighting SBCs in 
the CEECs in the light of their integration into the EU, since under EU-law practices such 
as SBC-subsidisation are strictly ruled out. The latter feature, however, is not incorporated 
into the model. 
21 Australia and New Zealand adopted a common competition policy when founding a 
free  trade area.  Remarkebly, as soon as this common competition policy wag  in  place, 
anti-dumping measures were abolished.  This suggests that common competition policy 
enforcement and anti-dumping measures could be substitutional devices.  For a discussion, 
see Hoekman, (1998). 
22 FI:om this perspective, and to the extent that common competition policy enforcement 
is a more effective way to fight SBCs, the immediate integration of the CEECs into the EU 
would be the more appropriate option. A related issue is that CEECs are not easily willing 
to give up preferential policies before entering the EU if  they cannot yet fully reap all the 
benefits associated with EU-membership.  However,  compliance with EU-regulations is 
exactly one of the preconditions for  EU-membership. 
23Including consumer surplus (CS) would result in a lower value for t*  , as  ~~ > 0 and 
13 Another assumption we  make is  that of equal marginal costs for  both 
countries.  In the more intuitive case where the transition country has a 
comparative cost advantage,  i.e.  c  >  cf ,  all  our results go through.  The 
assumption that c > cf  would simply bring about an additional cost asym-
metry between the two countries on top of the subsidy.  The higher this cost 
asymmetry, the higher the countervailing tariff, and the more our results are 
being reinforced. 
Finally, our results are robust with respect to the type of competition as-
sumed.  The result stated in Proposition 6,  namely that protection hardens 
budget constraints, equally holds for  Bertrand competition with differenti-
ated goods.  The latter case is fully integrated in the Appendix. 
The analysis in section 2 clearly sets out empirically testable predictions. 
A promising route for  future empirical research is to verify,  on the basis of 
firm-level data, whether firms in transition countries that are subject to EU 
anti-dumping or countervailing duties,  show evidence of reduced levels  of 
SBCs over time.  The measurement of SBCs could then occur along the lines 
recently proposed by Schaffer (1998). 
4  Concl  usion 
Despite the many attempts, over the past decade, to reform and to establish 
a market-based economy, important incentive distortions have continued to 
exist in many of the transition countries.  Hard financial discipline in par-
ticular has been difficult  to enforce such that  SBCs remain an important 
and widespread problem.  Using a three-stage two-country model we  analyse 
how SBCs in an exporting country affect and are affected by an import tariff 
from the recipient country.  This framework allows us to study SBCs in the 
context of an international duopoly.  Two cases are considered:  one where 
import protection is absent and one where the government of the importing 
country optimally sets a  countervailing tariff.  Our paper suggests that EU 
protectionist policy against SBC-imports from transition countries can  "help 
to impose financial  discipline in  these countries.  Thus, we  argue that an 
external constraint, such as EU trade policy, can overcome the commitment 
lower prices are beneficial to consumers.  From Proposition 6,  it follows that the optimal 
value for  s*  would now  be greater,  compared to the level  of s*  in  the absence of CS. 
However, the result s*  It=t* < s*  It=o continues to hold with CS. See e.g.  Collie (1991) for 
an analysis that explicitly incorporates CS. 
14 problem policy-makers in transition economies are facing in reducing various 
types of SBCs. 
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.  Appendix:  Cournot competition 
Stage 3:  firms compete in quantities 
In the final stage of the game, we solve for the optimal quantities by maxi-
mizing profits.  First order conditions (FOCs) for the home and foreign firm 
respectively are 
II",  =  (P - c) + Xpl =  0  (27) 
II;I = (P - c + s - t) + xl  pi =  O.  (28) 
Given that demand is not too convex, second order conditions (SOCs) for a 
profit maximum are satisfied, i.e. 
2pl +XP" < 0 
2pl + xl  pll < O. 




pi +XP" < 0 





such that the solutions for x' and xl • will be stable and unique (Brander, 
1995).  The equilibrium values24  are function of the remaining variables in 
the model, i.e. 
x·  + - x( t, s) 
1(- +)  X  t,  S  • 
(33) 
(34) 
24We  assume an interior solution, i.e.  x' and x' f  are strictly positive.  See Venables 
(1986) for a discussion. 
17 Comparative statics' results for  s  can  be found  by differentiating both 
FOCs (27)  and (28)  with respect to S25. 
dx  dx! 
II",,,, ds + II",,,,I di" + II",. = 0  (35) 
=  !  dx!  !  dx  II!  = 
II""""  ds  +II"""'ds +  ",I.  o.  (36) 
As II",.  =  0 and II~/. = 1,  we  can rewrite this set of equations in  matrix 
notation 
( II",,,,  II",,,,I  )(: )=(0  )  II!  II!  d",!  -1· 
",I",  ",I",!  d. 
(37) 





ds  II",,,,  II",,,,! 
II~!  '"  II~!  ",I 
(38) 
-II",,,,  0 
=~>  .  (39) 
The determinant in the denominator  is  positive,  i.e.  /::;.  =  II",,,,II~!,,,!  -
II",,,,,II~!,,,  > 0,  since  III",,,, I >  III",,,,,1  and  III~''''/I  >  III~!",I.  From expression 
(31)  we know that II",,,,I  < 0 whereas from  (29)  II",,,,  < o.  This results in a 
negative effect of s on the optimal quantity x* and a positive effect of s on the 
optimal level of output ofthe foreign producer x! *.  Since III",,,, I > III",,,,! j, the 
effect of a subsidy is stronger on the optimal for~i  n output level, compared 
to the effect on the home equilibrium output, i.e.  ~  I  < at· 
We proceed completely analogously for  the  ect of a tariff increase on 
the optimal output levels.  In (35)  and (36),  we  know have II",t  =  0 and 
25 Notice that at this stage *  =  0 such that ~  corresponds to the direct effect of son 
output. 
18 II~/t =  -1, and we  immediately write down the set of equations in matrix 
notation: 
( II",,,,  II",,,,I  )(~~ )=(0)  II!  II!  d",1  l' 
",I",  ",1",1  <ti: 
(40) 
and solve for  ~~ and d::  respectively, using Cramer's rule and our knowledge 






I=T<O.  (42) 
Again, we see that  ~~ < Id::1  since III",,,, I >  III",,,,,I.  Notice that the effect of 
a tariff increase on the price, is given by 
dP = pldx  pldx! > O. 
dt  dt +  dt 
This expression is positive, as pI < 0 and  ~~ <  1 d:: I. 
Stage 2:  optimal level of taxation 
In the second stage of the game under the protectionist case, the home gov-
ernment sets its level of the tariff so as to maximise its total welfare 
G(t,s) = II(x(t,s),x!(t,s)) +tx!(t,s).  (43) 
The FOe implies setting the derivative with respect to t equal to zero. 
G  - dIIdx  dii dx!  x!  tdx!  = ° 
t  - dx dt + dx!  dt  +  +  dt  .  (44) 
19 The first  term from  (44)  drops,  since  ~~ = 0 from the FOe (27)  in stage 
3.  To see whether the optimal tariff is  positive, we look at the sign of Gt  at 
.L  A  ~ 
~ = v, l.e. 
(45) 
In (45)  ::J  = xP'.  Given the interior solution and that P' < 0,  this is neg-
ative.  Further, we have that d;:  <  0 from comparative statics.  Since we 
assume that foreign  demand is also positive in  equilibrium (xl * >  0),  the 
optimand function at t =  0 is increasing.  The properties of our demand func-
tions ensure we have a single-peaked government welfare function.  Therefore, 
the fact that the derivative of G at a zero tariff rate is still increasing, implies 
that the maximum of G will correspond to a value of t* > 0:  we can do better 
in terms of government welfare to increase the tariff above zero.  The optimal 
tariff is strictly positive in equilibrium. 
Proposition 7  The  optimal countervailing tariff is strictly positive. 
An alternative way to show this property is to rewrite FOe (44)  to find 
an expression for t* : 
_  dO  dxf  _  xl 
t* =  dxf  d~f  > O.  (46) 
ill 
The sign of the numerator is  negative, that of the denominator is also nega-
tive.  Thus, the tariff rate is positive. 
The SOC  still has to be verified.  Therefore,  we  calculate the second 
derivative of G with respect to t: 
(47) 
From comparative statics we know that d;:  < 0 and the SOC is satisfied: 
Gtt < O.  (48) 
When we differentiate the FOe (44)  with respect to s, the expression we 
become is 
dxI  . 
Gts  =  ds > O.  (49) 
20 Totally differentiating the FOe (44) yields 
A0"  A0"  Gt  = 0 =}  ~::  ' dt + ~  A- , ds = O. 
at  as 
(50) 
Solving for  ~  and taking into account that Gtt < 0 and Gts > 0, we have 
shown that 
(51) 
An increase in the level of the subsidy causes an increase in the optimal 
level of import taxation. 
Proposition 8  : Soft budget constraints lead to higher levels of international 
trade protection. 
Notice that we can derive an explicit value for  ~: 
dt  Gt  dxi  dxi 
- = __  s  = _~  = ~  = 0 5  (52) 
ds  Gtt  2d::  2d::  •• 
This implies that an increase of the level of subsidy gives rise to a  less than 
proportional increase of the tariff, 
dt(s) < 1 
ds  '  (53) 
i.e.  subsidies are not fully offset by countervailing tariffs. 
Proposition 9  Countervailing tariffs are  not fully  countervailing. 
Stage lA: optimal level of the SBC under pro-
tectionism 
In the final stage of solving the model, we maximise the welfare function of 
the foreign government 
Gf(S) = rrf(x(t(s),s),xf(t(s),s),t(s),s) - sxf(t(s),s),  (54) 
or alternatively 
Gf(S) = (P(s) - c - t(s))xf(s).  (55) 
21 Again, we set the derivative with respect to S26 
Gf 
8 
axf dt  axfaxf  dt  axf 
(P-c-t)(--+ -)  +Xfpl(_-+-) 
at  ds  as  at  ds  as 
+xf  pi  (ax dt + ax) _ xf dt 
at ds  as  ds' 
(56) 
equal to zero,  G~ = O.  To derive the sign of the optimal level of subsidy, we 
look at the sign of G~ when s  =  O.  From the FOe of profit maximisation, 
we get that 
(57) 
Substituting this in  the expression for  G~ , gives that the first  and second 
term drop. We are left with investigating the sign of 
Gf I  =  f p(ax  dt  ax) _  fdt 
8  8=0  x  at ds + as  x  ds· 
We derive whether 
f pl(ax dt  ax)?  f dt 
x  at ds + as  < x  ds· 
Given that xf > 0,  we compare 
pl(ax dt + ax) ~ dt. 
at ds  as  ds 
Using the fact that :  = - ~~ and that *  = 0.5, we have to show that 
P,ax  ?  1 
- at <  . 
Substitution of (41)  in (61)  yields 
p IT",,,,,  ?  1 






We further substitute the expressions in the numerator and denominator to 
get 
26Notice that now, 1. =f 0 and therefore ~  is composed of both the direct effect of s 
on x,  ~~, as well as the indirect effect of s on x through t,  ~~ 1.. 
22 P'(XPII + Pi)  ? 
-II--TT-:I"----TT-..:..II-I~ < l. 
xxJ.J.xlxi  - J.J.xxf  mix 
The denominator can be written as 
(63) 
(2pl + xP")(2P' + xl  P") - (XP" + P')(XI p" + Pi),  (64) 
and simplifies to 
3(PI)2 + xl  pip" + xP'  P", 
such that expression (63)  can be written as 





Given that demand is  not too convex, the second term is  not too negative 
such that the above inequality is satisfied.  Consequently, inequality (59)  is 
also satisfied and we have 
(68) 
Given that the properties of the demand functions yield single-peaked welfare 
functions,  the optimal level' of subsidy,  in the presence of a  countervailing 
tariff is strictly negative, s' < o. 
Finally, one has to check whether the SOC for  a  maximum is  satisfied. 
Taking the second derivative of GI with respect to s yields: 
ct. < 0,  (69) 
from demand that is well-behaved and implies we have indeed found a max-
unum. 
Stage IB: optimal level of the SBC under 'free 
trade' 
In the case of 'free trade', the foreign government's welfare function is the 
following: 
23 (70) 
Solving the first  stage of the model implies that ,'Ie  ma.ximise  the welfare 
function of the foreign government by setting the derivative with respect to 
s equal to zero: 
dITI dx  BIT!  dxf 
Gf = --+ --- xf - s- = 0 
S  dx  ds  Bs  ds' 
(71) 
where the term 
dITf dxf 
dxf ds = 0,  (72) 
has dropped from the FOe (71), as a result ofthe previous FOe (28).  Notice 
that 8~: = xf such that the second and third terms also drop from expression 
(71).  To see whether the optimal level of subsidy is positive, we look at the 
sign of G{  when s =  0: 
!  _  dITf dx 
Gs  Is=o- dx  ds  > O.  (73) 
From (38)  we know that  ~~ < O.  Further, we know that  d~:  =  xl  P' < O. 
In sum, G{  Is=o  is positive such that the optimal level of subsidisation under 
the no-protection case is  s* > o. 
Alternatively,  one  can  show  that the optimal level of subsidisation is 
positive by explicitly solving for  s*  in the FOe (71).  We then get: 
dDt dx 
s' =  dx  ds  > 0 
dxt  '  (74) 
dB 
since both the numerator and denominator are positive. 
A  final  way to show that the optimal level of subsidisation is  strictly 
positive follows the analysis under (57).  We can rewrite the FOe of foreign 
welfare optimisation as 
dxf  dxf  dx 
Gf = (P - c-t)-+xfp'-+xfp'- = o. 
s  ds  ds  ds 
(75) 
Using the FOe of foreign profit maximisation at s = 0 in (58), we obtain the 
expressIOn 
24 (;1 I  n= ",I pi dx '> () 
~8 ,S=u  .........  ds'- 'V, 
as shown before.  Collecting the results from  (68)  and (73),  we  get the fol-
lowing ranking: 
s;=o > 0 > s;=t" 
Under protectionism, SBCs are hardened. 
Proposition 10  Protection hardens budget constraints. 
Notice that  d~: = d! ~~ + 8Ji.f  > 0 as both terms are positive. 
(76) 
Finally, one has to check whether the SOC for a  maximum is  satisfied. 
Taking the second derivative of Gf with respect to s yields: 
dxI 
G~8 = ---;z; < O.  (77) 
Well-behaved demand properties ensure we have indeed found a maximum. 
Appendix:  Bertrand competition 
In the case of Bertrand competition with differentiated products, demand in 







Demand is downward sloping with respect to its own price,  but positively 
related to the rival price. We assume that the cross-price effect is weaker than 
the own price effect.  Profits of the home and foreign  producer respect~vely 
equal 
II(p, pI) 
III(pI,p, t, s) 




The expressions for the home and foreign government's welfare continue to 
apply. 
25 Stage 3:  firms compete in prices 
We solve for  the optimal prices by  maximizing profits.  FOes for  the honle 
and foreign firm respectively are: 
(82) 
(83) 
Given  that the demand functions  are  not  too convex,  SOCs  for  a  profit 
maximum are satisfied, i.e. 
(p - c)Xpp + 2Xp < 0 
(pI - c +  8  - t)XI  + 2XI  < O.  pipi  pi 
From the properties imposed on the demand functions, it follows that 
(p - C)Xppi + Xpi > 0 





such that the solutions for p and p' will be stable and unique (Brander, 1995) 
and will yield expressions that are a  function of the remaining variables of 
the model, i.e. 27 
+  -
p( t, 8) 
I  +  - p(t,8). 
(88) 
(89) 
Comparative statics' results for  8  can be found by differentiating FOCs 
(86) and (87) with respect to 828 , 
27We assume an interior solution, i.e.  X  and Xl are strictly positive.  For a discussion, 
see Venables (1986). 







_  dv  dv! 
llpp 7- + IIppl --7- +  IIps  =  0 
uS  as- (90) 
(91) 
As  lIps = 0 and II~I  s =  X;I' we can rewrite this set of equations in matrix 
notation 
( IIpp  IIppl  )(~ )_(0  )  II!  II!  ~  - X!  .  pIp  plpl  ds  - pI 
(92) 
Using Cramer's rule, the solutions for ~  and ¥.respectively are easy to find, 
being 
dp  =  I ~X;I 
IIppl 
I 
II!  = ITppIX;1  plpf 
<0  (93) 
ds  I ITpp  IIppl 
I 
6. 
II!  II~/pl  pfp 
I IIpp  0 
I  dp!  II~/p  -X!  -ITpPX;f  pf  <0.  (94) 
ds  I IIpp  IIppl 
I 
6. 
II!  II!  pfp  pfpf 
The  determinant  in  the  denominator  is  positive,  i.e.  6.  =  IIppIT~fpf -
IIppfII~/p >  0,  since  [ITpp[  > IIppf  and  IIT~fp/l >  IT~fp.  This can be under-
stood by recognising that (p - c)  [Xpp[  > (p - C)Xppf  and 2 [Xp[  > Xpf, and 
similarly for  III~fpf I  >  IT~fp.  From expression (90)  it follows that ITppf  > 0 
while foreign  demand is  downward sloping in its own price,  i.e.  X;f <  O. 
This results in a  negative effect of s on the optimal price p*.  Analogously, 
from expression (84)  ITpp  < 0  while X;I < 0 continues to hold.  Given the 
negative sign in front of the expression, the effect of an increase in s on the 
optimal level of p! * is negative.  Since [IIpp[  > ITppf,  the effect of a subsidy is 
stronger on the foreign price, compared to the effect on the home price, i.e. 
l¥sl  < I¥.I· 
27 We proceed completely analogously for  the effect of a tariff increase on 
the optimal level of the prices.  Differentiating the FOCs (82) and (83)  with 
respect to t  and keeping in mind that IIpt  =  0 and  IT~'t =  -X;"  we  can 
immediately write down the set of equations in matrix notation: 
( ITpp  ITpp'  )(1£)  (0  ) 
IT~,p  IT~,p,  ¥t  =  X~  , 
(95) 
and solve for  ~  and ¥t  respectively, using Cramer's rule 
(96) 
(97) 
Stage 2:  optimal level of taxation 
In the second stage of the game, the home government sets the tariff level 
that maximises total welfare, 
G(t,s) =  IT(p(t,s),p!(t,s)) +tX!(P(t,s),p!(t,s)).  (98) 
The FOC implies setting the derivative with respect to t equal to zero: 
G  = dITdp  dIT dp!  X!  (aX! dp!  ax! dp) = 0 
t  dp  dt + dp!  dt  +  + tap!  dt  +  ap  dt  .  . (99) 
The first term from the expression drops, since :  = 0 from the FOC (82) 
in stage 3.  To see whether the optimal tariff is positive, we  look at the sign 
of Gt  at t = 0,  i.e. 
_  dIT dp!  .  ! 
Gt It=o- dp!  dt  + X  .  (100) 
28 If the domestic firm is to produce anything in equilibrium, i.e.  X  > 0,  this 
implies that p - c  >  O.  Moreover,  cross-price effects  have been assumed 
to be positive,  i.e.  g;.  > O.  Thus,  :;; >  O.  Further,  we  have shown that 
¥t > O.  Since we assume that foreign demand is also positive in equilibrium 
(XI> 0),  the optimand function at t  =  0 is increasing.  The properties of 
our demand functions  ensure we  have a  single-peaked government welfare 
function.  Therefore, the fact that the derivative of G at a zero tariff rate is 
still increasing, implies that the maximum of G will correspond to a value of 
t* > 0:  we can do better in terms of government welfare to increase the tariff 
above zero.  The optimal tariff is strictly positive in equilibrium. 
Proposition 11  The optimal countervailing tariff is strictly positive. 
An alternative way to show this property is to find  an expression for  t* 
from the FOe (99): 
_  dII!E!!..  _  Xl 
t* =  dpf  dt  > O.  (101) 
ax!!!:e!.. + ax! 1£ 
apf  dt  ap  dt 
We already know that the sign of the numerator is negative.  In the denom-
inator, both ¥t  and *  are positive.  We also know that cross-price effects 
are positive and own price effects are negative, i.e.  ~: < 0 and  a~f > O. 
Moreover,  we know that the effect of t on the optimal price is  stronger for 
pI, i.e.  !fff  < ¥t  and cross-price effects are smaller in absolute value than 
own-price effects,  i.e.  IWI > a::,  such that the denominator is negative. 
This yields a tariff rate that is positive. 
From the properties of demand, the SOC is assumed to be satisfied, i.e. 
Gtt < O. 
Totally differentiating the FOe (99) yields: 
oGt  oGt 
Gt  =  0 =} Ttdt +  os ds =  O.  (102) 
Solving for f  and taking into account that Gtt < 0 and Gts > 0,  we have 
shown that 
dt  = _ Gts  > O. 
ds  Gtt 
(103) 
An increase in the level of the subsidy causes an increase in the level of 
import taxation. 
29 Proposition 12  :  Soft budget  constraints  lead  to  higher levels  of interna-
tional trade protection. 
Stage lA: optimal level of the SBC under pro-
tectionism 
In the final stage of solving the model, we  maximise the welfare function of 
the foreign government, 
G/(S)  rrl (p(t( s), s), pi  (t(s), s), t(  s), s) - sX  I (p(t( s), s ),pl  (t( s), ~~P4) 
(pi - c - t)XI.  (105) 
Again, we set the derivative with respect to s equal to zero29 
GI = drrl (op dt + ap ) + arrl dt + arrl  _ Xl _  s dXI = 0  (106) 
8  dp  at ds  as  at  ds  as  ds' 
where 
dxfaxl  apl dt  apl  axl  ap dt  ap  (107) 
ds  =  apl (7ft  ds + Ts) +  ap  (at ds + a)' 
and where the term 
drrl  apl dt  apl 
dpl (at  ds + Ts) = 0,  (108) 
has dropped from the FOe (106).  To derive the sign of the optimal level of 
subsidy, we look at the sign of G{ when s = O. 
cf 1_ = drr/(apdt  ap ) _  X ldt  ?  O. 
8  8-0  dp  at ds + as  ds  <  (109) 
From (103)  we know that ~  > O.  Further, foreign demand is nonnegative in 
equilibrium,  i.e.  X f  > O.  Therefore (pi - c - t + s)  > O.  If not, it would 
29 Notice that now,  ~  oF 0 and therefore '!Is  is composed of both the direct effect of son 
p,  ¥S-,  as well as the indirect effect of s on p through t, ~~. 
30 be better not to produce at all,  i.e.  X f  =  O.  By the assumption of cross-
price effects, a::  > O.  What remains to be shown, for  (109) to hold, is that 
~¥S + ~  < O.  In other words, we want to show that 
-IIppfX:f (-1)Cts  IIppfX:f 
<  0  (llO)  +  £:,  Ctt  £:, 
IIppfX:f (1 + Cts ) 
£:,  Gtt  <  O.  (1l1) 
From (93) we know that the first factor of the above expression is negative. 
Therefore, it has to be shown that 
? 
Cts < -Ctt. 
Writing out the expressions for Cts and Ctt yields: 
Therefore, we have proven that 
Gfl_=dIIf(Bpdt  Bp)_Xfdt  1 0. 




Given the properties of the demand functions, the foreign  welfare function 
can be assumed to be single  peaked.  The above findings  imply that the 
optimal level of subsidy is  negative:  s' < O.  The proofs also imply that an 
increase in the subsidy level gives rise to a less than proportional increase in 
the tariff, 
Ct  dt(s) 
(1 + -')  > 0 ==> - < 1, 
Ctt  ds 
(1l7) 
l.e.  subsidies are not fully offset by countervailing tariffs. 
31 Proposition 13  Countervailing tariffs are  not fully countervailing. 
Alternatively,  one can show  that  the optimal level  of subsidisation  IS 
negative by explicitly solving for  s' in the FOC (106).  We then get 
dIll (.!!E.ill.  +.£E) _  XU!:. 
s' =  dp  8t ds  as  ds  < 0  (118) 
oXI (!!l!!..ill. +  apl )  +  axl (PE.!l!:.  +  PE.)  .  7fPT  8t  ds  as  ap  at ds  as 
The numerator of s' bears a  nefative sign.  The denominator is  positive, 
since I  axl I  >  ax  I  and ~El  +  !!E:....  < .£EEl +  .!!E.  < O.  The holds since 
apl  ap  at  ds  as  8t dB  as 
IT  X!  dt 
~(--1)  6.  ds  < 
ITpp  < 
(-l)ITppIX;1 (dt -1) 
6.  ds 
(-l)ITppl• 
Finally,  the demand properties ensure we  have a  maximum:  SOCs are 
satisfied. 
Stage IB: optimal level of the SBC under 'free 
trade' 
In the case of 'free trade', the foreign government's welfare function is  the 
following: 
c!  (s) = IT! (p(s),p! (s), s) - sX!  (p(s),p! (s)).  (119) 
Solving this stage of the model implies that we maximise the welfare function 
of the foreign government by setting the derivative with respect to s equal 
to zero 
C!=dITidp+oIT! _X!_sdX! =0 
s  dp  ds  os  ds'  (120) 
where 
dX!  oX! dpf  oX! dp 
-=--+--
ds  op!  ds  op  ds' 
(121) 
and where the term 
32 dIIi dpl 
--:z:f -:;- = 0, 
uIF  uS 
(122) 
has dropped from the FOe (120).  To see whether the optimal level of subsidy 
.is  positive, we  look at the sign of Gt when s = 0: 
I  _  dIrI dp 
Gs  Is=o- dp  ds < O.  (123) 
From (93)  we know that ¥.  < O.  Again,  we  assume that foreign demand is 
nonnegative in equilibrium, i.e.  Xl > o.  Therefore, (pi - c - t + s)  > O.  If 
not, it would be better not to produce at all, i.e. Xl = O.  By the assumption 
of cross-price effects  a~1 > o.  In  sum, Gt  Is=o  is  negative, i.e. 
I  _  dIrI dp 
G s  Is=o- dp  ds < O.  (124) 
Given the properties of the demand functions,  the foreign  welfare function 
can be assumed to be single peaked.  The above findings thus imply that the 
optimal level of subsidy is  negative.  s* < o. 
Alternatively,  one can show  that the optimal level  of subsidisation  IS 
negative by explicitly solving for  s* in the FOe (120).  We then get 
dnl  !E!. 
s* =  dp  ds  < o.  (125) 
aXI!l::£!... + aXi!E!. 
apl  ds  ap  ds 
The numerator of  s*  bears a  negative sign.  The denominator is  positive, 
since  I~I > 1flE.1  and laxil > axl.  ds  ds  {)pi  ap 
Finally, one has to check whether the SOC for a  maximum is  satisfied. 
Taking the second derivative of GI with respect to s yields 
G~s < O.  (126) 
which implies we have indeed found a maximum. 
Comparison between levels of subsidy 
Although both levels of subsidy were negative in the optimisation exercises,. 
we still van show that subsidisation is looser under the 'free trade' case.  We 
can show that 
33 (127) 
We cross-multiply the numerators and denominators of the expressions for 
8;=0  and 8;=t.,  (ll8) and (125)  respectively and become 
This expression can be simplified as follows 
Collecting terms yields 
The expression on the right hand side of the inequality is strictly negative, 
since  c:::,; ¥. + a~f!f!s >  0 as shown before,  g!  >  0 from  (103)  and foreign 
demand is positive, i.e.  Xl > O.  On the left hand side, we already know that 
d!;  is  positive, whereas  ~~; is  negative.  The sign of the last factor still has 
to be verified.  As both terms are positive, it is unclear which expression is 
the bigger one.  If  we can show that 
(131) 
8;=0 > s;=t'  is satisfied.  Using the comparative statics' results, we can rewrite 
(131)  as  . 
34 It immediately follows that 
1 
IIpp! (-1  )IIpp  ~ (-1  )IIppIIppJ,  (133) 
since both expressions in (132)  are equal.  Thus, we have s;=o  > s;=t':  sub-
sidisation is  looser under the 'free trade' case.  Protection hardens budget 
constraints. 
Proposition 14 Protection hardens budget constraints. 
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